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Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela: Dark Times 
Ahead for Class Arbitrations 
JOANNA NIWOROWSKI* 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was enacted in 1925 to 
combat judicial hostility towards arbitration. Over the years, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as evidencing a 
pro-arbitration policy and has upheld the use of arbitration claus-
es in a variety of contracts. Unfortunately, while the FAA was able 
to overcome the hostility towards arbitration, it was not able to 
stop the Court from finding a new target: class arbitrations. 
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela. In critiquing the Court’s continued 
erosion of the availability of class arbitrations, this Comment con-
siders the negative effects of the pro-business decision on employ-
ees and consumers who are subject to arbitration clauses. This 
Comment concludes that congressional action is needed to reverse 
the years of flawed class arbitration jurisprudence. 
   
 
 *  Senior Articles Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Volume 75. J.D. 
Candidate 2021, University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2018, University of 
Miami. I would like to thank Professor Caroline Bradley for her guidance. I 
would also like to thank my family and friends for all of their love and support. 




A.  The Federal Arbitration Act and the Preemption 
Doctrine ...........................................................................261 
B.  Supreme Court Precedent Underlying Lamps Plus .........263 
1.   STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS ..................................263 
2.  AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION .................................265 
II.   LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA ...................................................268 
A.  Background Facts and Procedural Posture ....................268 
B.  The Majority Opinion ......................................................270 
C.  The Concurring Opinion ..................................................273 
D.  The Dissenting Opinions ..................................................273 
1.  JUSTICE GINSBURG ......................................................273 
2.  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR ..................................................274 
3.   JUSTICE KAGAN ...........................................................275 
III.  COMMENT ON THE LAMPS PLUS DECISION ..............................276 
A.  A Look at the Legislative History and the Court’s 
Hostility Towards Class Arbitration ................................276 
B.  Preemption of contra proferentem ...................................285 
C.  Future Impact of Lamps Plus ...........................................294 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................300 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly a decade has passed since the Supreme Court decided in 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.1 that to 
compel class arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act2 (the 
“FAA” or the “Act”) there must be a “contractual basis for con-
cluding that the part[ies] agreed to do so.”3 The Court in that case 
concluded that the silence of the agreement at issue was not 
enough to compel arbitration.4 The decision, however, left a few 
unanswered questions. The Court did not address what would hap-
pen if the agreement was not silent but merely ambiguous.5 Nor 
 
 1 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 3 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684. 
 4 Id. at 687. 
 5 See id. at 687 n.10. 
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did the Court specify what it meant exactly by a “contractual ba-
sis” and what was necessary in an agreement to meet that thresh-
old.6 These questions were left up in the air until the Supreme 
Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela in 2019.7 
In Lamps Plus, the Court was once again faced with the ques-
tion of whether to compel class arbitration.8 The Court had to come 
face to face with the questions it left unanswered in Stolt-
Nielsen9—“whether, consistent with the FAA, an ambiguous 
agreement can provide the necessary ‘contractual basis’ for com-
pelling class arbitration.”10 It held that ambiguity, like silence, 
cannot constitute a sufficient contractual basis for compelling class 
arbitration.11 
The Lamps Plus decision is a continuation of the Court’s 
flawed class arbitration jurisprudence. This Comment aims to ana-
lyze the reasoning of the Lamps Plus Court to point out that, while 
the decision is a natural progression of the Court’s recent arbitra-
tion jurisprudence, it rests on an unsound foundation. The Lamps 
Plus Court’s decision was predictable in its incorrect characteriza-
tion of class arbitration as less efficient than individual arbitration 
and as inherently incompatible with the goals of the FAA.12 Fur-
thermore, this Comment argues that the Court should not have so 
hastily preempted the state contract rule known as contra 
proferentem (the “anti-drafter rule”), a widely used, neutral con-
tract rule that dictates reading an ambiguous contract against the 
drafter.13 
This Comment’s main goal is to point out the potential nega-
tive impact of this decision on employees and consumers—
individuals with relatively little bargaining power.14 The use of 
 
 6 See id. 
 7 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019). 
 8 See id. at 1412. 
 9 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 662. 
 10 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684). 
 11 Id. at 1417. 
 12 See id. at 1415–17. 
 13 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 2012). 
 14 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbi-
tration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 
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mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer con-
tracts has been on the rise in recent years.15 The Supreme Court 
has previously upheld the use of class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements, making it easier for employers and businesses to pre-
vent class arbitrations from being brought.16 The effect of Lamps 
Plus will be to further reduce the availability of class arbitrations—
even where there is no explicit class waiver—with little hope for 
employees or consumers to be able to negotiate for this procedural 
option. 
Part I of this Comment lays out basic background information 
about the Federal Arbitration Act and discusses two significant 
Supreme Court cases that form the basis for the holding in Lamps 
Plus. Part II lays out the relevant background facts and procedural 
history of Lamps Plus as well as the reasoning of the majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the majori-
ty’s decision, discussing its basis in legislative history, the majori-
ty’s view of arbitration, and the preemption of the contra 
proferentem rule. Part III concludes by discussing the decision’s 
future implications on employees and consumers and calls for con-
gressional action to address the issues surrounding the FAA and 
class arbitrations. 
 
2863–74 (2015) (discussing expansion of FAA to parties with little bargaining 
power). 
 15 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 9–10 (2015) (summarizing that “[t]ens of millions of 
consumers use consumer financial products or services” that are subject to man-
datory arbitration and nearly all of which include class waivers); ALEXANDER 
J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION, 1–2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-
mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-
million-american-workers/ (discussing results of a study that found that amount 
of workers subject to mandatory arbitration has more than doubled since early 
2000s and now exceeds fifty-five percent). 
 16 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–48, 
352 (2011) (preempting a state law that conditioned enforceability of consumer 
contract arbitration agreements on availability of class arbitration procedures). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act and the Preemption Doctrine 
The Federal Arbitration Act17 was enacted in 1925 to make ar-
bitration agreements “in any maritime transaction or . . . contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce” valid and enforcea-
ble.18 Section 2 of the FAA provides that: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or 
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.19 
Through this Section, Congress intended to ensure arbitration 
agreements were generally valid and enforceable by placing them 
“upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] be-
long . . . .”20 The motivation behind the passage of the FAA was to 
combat judicial hostility towards arbitration that would often inter-
fere with enforcement of contracts that contained arbitration claus-
es.21 
 
 17 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 18 Id. at § 2; JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT 1 (2017). 
 19 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that Section 2 of FAA is “primary substan-
tive provision of the Act”). 
 20 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“The purpose of this bill is to make 
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving 
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the 
subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”); see also S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 
(1924) (“The purpose of the bill is clearly set forth in section 2 . . . .”). 
 21 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2; SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, 
at 2. 
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted this statute 
as evidencing “a national policy favoring arbitration” that “with-
drew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the res-
olution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by 
arbitration.”22 The Court has also stated that a “fundamental prin-
ciple” of the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of contract”23 and 
that the statute requires courts to “enforce arbitration agreements 
according to their terms.”24 
Generally, under the FAA, state contract rules govern arbitra-
tion clauses and their interpretation and enforcement.25 However, 
the Court has, at times, preempted state contract law that interfered 
with arbitration contracts and was inconsistent with the goals and 
purposes of the FAA.26 The “saving clause” in Section 2 of the 
FAA 27—“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract”28—has been interpreted by the Su-
preme Court to limit the possible grounds on which a court may 
deny the enforcement of an arbitration provision.29 The Court has 
interpreted the saving clause to mean that “generally applicable 
 
 22 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); see also Jodi Wilson, 
How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 91, 97 (2012) (discussing how Court’s policy favor-
ing arbitration turned arbitration agreements into “super contracts”). 
 23 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010). 
 24 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
 25 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019); 
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5. 
 26 SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5; see also Volt Info. Scis., 
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) 
(“[S]tate law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually con-
flicts with federal law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Maureen A. 
Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and 
Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 64 (2013) 
[hereinafter Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute] (“Lacking an express 
preemptive intent, FAA preemption is implied based on the broadest form of 
‘conflict preemption,’ which generally warrants narrow construction.”). 
 27 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
 28 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 29 SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5; see also Wilson, supra 
note 22, at 107. 
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contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may 
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contraven-
ing § 2” of the FAA.30 Thus, arbitration contracts may be held to 
be invalid and unenforceable under state law principles but only 
through such principles that are generally applicable to all con-
tracts and are not otherwise hostile to arbitration agreements.31 The 
saving clause, the Court has stated, does not intend “to preserve 
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of 
the FAA’s objectives,” namely, the goal of ensuring the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements.32 
B.  Supreme Court Precedent Underlying Lamps Plus 
1.  STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS 
One of the key precedents underlying the Lamps Plus decision 
was Stolt-Nielsen, which involved a dispute between a shipping 
company, Stolt-Nielsen S.A., and its customers over alleged anti-
trust violations.33 AnimalFeeds International Corp., one of Stolt-
Nielsen’s customers, shipped goods around the world pursuant to a 
standard maritime contract known as a “charter party,” which con-
tained an arbitration clause.34 After the Second Circuit held that the 
parties had to arbitrate their dispute, AnimalFeeds served Stolt-
Nielsen with a demand for class arbitration, seeking to bring a 
 
 30 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 31 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (“[The] saving clause permits agree-
ments to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only 
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to 
arbitrate is at issue.” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687)); Doctor’s 
Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements 
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”). 
 32 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343; see also Weston, The Accidental 
Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64 (“Since Southland, the preemption 
doctrine has become an oft-used mechanism for the Supreme Court to overturn 
state legislation that not only invalidate arbitration agreements or single out 
arbitration agreements for different treatment than other contracts, but increas-
ingly to overturn state laws deemed as ‘hostile’ towards arbitration.”). 
 33 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666–67 
(2010). 
 34 Id. 
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class action on behalf of all the customers that purchased transpor-
tation services from Stolt-Nielsen.35 The parties stipulated that the 
“arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration” 
and entered into a supplemental agreement that provided that the 
question of whether class arbitration was permitted was to be sub-
mitted to a panel of arbitrators.36 The panel concluded that the par-
ticular arbitration clause did allow class arbitration proceedings.37 
The Supreme Court was presented with the question of 
“whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration 
clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with the” FAA.38 The 
Court held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to 
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for 
concluding that the party agreed to do so.”39 Justice Alito, writing 
for the majority, reasoned that, because a foundational principle of 
the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of consent,” an arbitrator 
may not infer an implicit agreement to permit class arbitration 
solely from the arbitration agreement.40 The majority explained 
that class arbitration is drastically different from bilateral arbitra-
tion, which has the benefits of “lower costs, greater efficiency and 
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve spe-
cialized disputes.”41 Thus, the parties’ silence on the issue of class 
proceedings is not enough to find consent to class arbitration.42 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that, while “the 
Court apparently demands contractual language one can read as 
affirmatively authorizing class arbitration,” the Court’s decision 
was seemingly limited as it “d[id] not insist on express consent to 
class arbitration.”43 In addition, she noted that the holding “appar-
ently spare[d] from its affirmative-authorization requirement con-
 
 35 Id. at 667–68. 
 36 Id. at 668. 
 37 Id. at 669. 
 38 Id. at 666. 
 39 Id. at 684. 
 40 See id. at 684–85; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the Act is a 
matter of consent, not coercion . . . .”). 
 41 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–87. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. at 697–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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tracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”44 These 
limitations seemed to be true, at least until the Court’s decision in 
Lamps Plus this year. 
2.  AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION 
Another significant case underlying the Lamps Plus decision 
was AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.45 The Court in Concep-
cion held that the FAA preempted a California judicial rule that 
classified most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable.46 The dispute in the case arose between AT&T 
and a class of its customers, who alleged that AT&T had “engaged 
in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it 
advertised as free.”47 Vincent and Liza Concepcion, whose com-
plaint was consolidated with the class, had entered into a contract 
with AT&T for the sale and service of cellphones, which included 
an arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver.48 When AT&T 
moved to compel arbitration of the Concepcions’ claim, the Con-
cepcions opposed arbitration, arguing that “the arbitration agree-
ment was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under Cali-
fornia law because it disallowed classwide procedures.”49 
The Supreme Court was faced with the question of “whether 
the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of 
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbi-
tration procedures.”50 Specifically, the Court was considering Cali-
fornia’s “Discover Bank rule,” which deemed most class action 
waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable51 and which the 
courts below applied to deem the arbitration clause at issue uncon-
scionable.52 The Court, considering the saving clause, reasoned 
that, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a partic-
ular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting 
 
 44 Id. at 699. 
 45 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 46 Id. at 340, 352. 
 47 Id. at 337. 
 48 Id. at 336–37. 
 49 Id. at 337–38. 
 50 Id. at 336. 
 51 Id. at 340. 
 52 Id. at 338. 
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rule is displaced by the FAA.”53 But where a generally applicable 
doctrine, such as duress or unconscionability, “is alleged to have 
been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration,” the inquiry is 
“more complex.”54 The Court stated that, even though “§ 2’s sav-
ing clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, noth-
ing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”55 In 
the present case, because “the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus cre-
ates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA,” the state law rule inter-
fered with the FAA and had to be preempted.56 
The majority saw California’s rule as interfering with arbitra-
tion for three reasons. First, the Court stated that switching from 
bilateral arbitration to class proceedings would not allow the par-
ties to take advantage of the fundamental advantages of bilateral 
arbitration, namely its informality.57 This would make the whole 
process “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate proce-
dural morass than final judgment.”58 The Court saw the point of 
arbitration as allowing the parties to have a specially designed pro-
cess that allows for efficient dispute resolution and where infor-
mality, which translated into greater speed of resolution and a re-
duction in costs, was desirable.59 Second, the Court found that 
class arbitration required procedural formality to ensure that absent 
class members were afforded their due process and would be 
 
 53 See id. at 339–41 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)). 
 54 Id. at 341; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (not-
ing that FAA may preempt even grounds that were traditionally considered to 
exist “at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” and that courts can-
not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law 
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the 
court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot”). 
 55 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343. 
 56 Id. at 344, 352. 
 57 Id. at 348. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 344–45; see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–59 (2008) 
(noting that main objective of an arbitral agreement is “streamlined proceedings 
and expeditious results,” and that preempting certain state law rules would “hin-
der speedy resolution of the controversy”). 
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bound by the judgment.60 It was unlikely, the Court argued, that 
Congress intended to give arbitrators the responsibility of ensuring 
that absent members’ due process rights were satisfied.61 Finally, 
the Court found that arbitration greatly increased the risks for de-
fendants because class arbitration carried much higher stakes for 
defendants with little chance for effective judicial review of the 
arbitration decision.62 Thus, because it “st[ood] as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress,” the California state law rule was preempted by 
the FAA.63 
The Concepcion decision invoked a notable dissent from Jus-
tice Breyer. Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority’s assertion 
that the California law was inconsistent with the FAA and its pri-
mary objective.64 He saw the rule as an application of the general 
principle of unconscionability that, by its terms, would have ap-
plied to any contract as required by the FAA.65 He also saw the 
rule as being consistent with the purpose behind the Act, pointing 
out why he believed the majority’s view of the FAA’s purpose was 
skewed.66 According to Justice Breyer, the purpose behind the 
FAA has been described by the Court as “one of ‘ensur[ing] judi-
cial enforcement’ of arbitration agreements.”67 Justice Breyer 
points out that Congress’s intent was to combat the judicial hostili-
ty towards arbitration that was prevalent before the Act’s passage, 
a goal Congress sought to achieve by “placing agreements to arbi-
trate ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”68 Justice Breyer 
further argued that the California law was consistent with Section 
 
 60 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 350–51. 
 63 Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 64 Id. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 65 See id. at 358–59. 
 66 See id. at 359–62. 
 67 See id. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. 
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 
219 (“We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration 
Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”). 
 68 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also S. REP. NO. 
68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting that purpose of FAA is “clearly set forth in section 
2” of Act). 
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2, and thus the FAA’s purpose, because it put all agreements on the 
same footing by placing the same limitation on both arbitration and 
litigation.69 He also went on to question the majority’s assertion 
that “individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental 
attribut[e]’ of arbitration.”70 He pointed out that class arbitration 
may have certain advantages, such as being more expeditious than 
class actions in court and more efficient than thousands of separate 
proceedings.71 Class arbitration may also preserve the claimants’ 
right to pursue small-dollar claims where they would have to oth-
erwise abandon them due to the high cost of individual arbitra-
tion.72 Justice Breyer concluded that there was little support or rea-
son for the preemption of the state law.73 
II.  LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA 
A. Background Facts and Procedural Posture 
Lamps Plus involved a dispute between the company Lamps 
Plus and its employees.74 In 2016, one of the company’s employ-
ees was tricked by a hacker, who had impersonated a company 
official, into disclosing the tax information of about 1,300 other 
Lamps Plus employees.75 Soon after the incident, a fraudulent tax 
return was filed in the name of Frank Varela, one of the Lamps 
Plus employees whose information was hacked.76 
 
 69 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. (alteration in original). 
 71 Id. at 363. 
 72 Id. at 365–66. Justice Breyer’s dissent also highlighted that the Court had 
previously authorized complex arbitration proceedings, such as antitrust claims 
in an international transaction in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), and had upheld state laws that in effect 
slowed down arbitration, such as a California state law staying arbitration until 
the resolution of related litigation in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), further 
calling into doubt the majority’s assertions that arbitration is not compatible 
with class proceedings. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 366 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 73 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 74 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412–13 (2019). 
 75 Id. at 1412. 
 76 Id. 
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Many of the employees, including Frank Varela, had signed an 
arbitration agreement when beginning their employment at Lamps 
Plus.77 The arbitration clause stated that “arbitration shall be in lieu 
of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to 
[the employee’s] employment.”78 Nevertheless, Varela brought a 
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, raising both federal and state law claims on behalf of a 
putative class of other employees who had been affected by the 
data breach.79 In response, Lamps Plus moved for an order to com-
pel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement to 
compel individual, rather than class, arbitration and to dismiss the 
pending lawsuit.80 The Central District of California granted the 
motion to compel and dismissed the suit without prejudice but 
compelled class arbitration.81 
Lamps Plus appealed the authorization of class arbitration, but 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.82 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that, although the arbitration agreement at issue 
did not expressly mention class arbitration, the issue was not con-
trolled by Stolt-Nielsen.83 because there was no stipulation here as 
to the silence of the arbitration clause with respect to class arbitra-
tion.84 In addition, the mere failure of the agreement to mention 
class proceedings was not the silence that Stolt-Nielsen found to be 
dispositive.85 The Ninth Circuit, instead, found the arbitration 
agreement to be ambiguous in regard to class arbitration.86 The 
Ninth Circuit applied California law, which dictated that, where a 
 
 77 Id. at 1413. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 84 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. The Ninth Circuit considered both parties’ arguments. Id. On one 
hand, Lamps Plus argued that the phrasing of the agreement contemplated 
“purely binary claims.” Id. On the other hand, Varela argued that other phrases 
were ambiguous enough to permit class arbitration, such as the phrase “arbitra-
tion shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relat-
ing to my employment.” Id. 
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contract is ambiguous, the court should construe the ambiguity 
against the drafter of the contract.87 Construing the contract in fa-
vor of Varela and against Lamps Plus, the drafter of the contract, 
the Court authorized class arbitration.88 Thereafter, Lamps Plus 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Ninth Circuit did 
not follow the controlling precedent of Stolt-Nielsen.89 
B. The Majority Opinion 
After discussing the Court’s jurisdiction and parties’ standing 
to appeal, the majority, led by Chief Justice Roberts, focused its 
discussion on the arbitration agreement at issue.90 The Court de-
ferred to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of state 
law and accepted that the agreement at issue was “ambiguous” on 
the issue of class arbitration.91 Thus, the Court saw the question at 
issue as “whether, consistent with the FAA, an ambiguous agree-
ment can provide the necessary ‘contractual basis’ for compelling 
class arbitration.”92 For the reasons discussed below, the Court 
held that, based on Stolt-Nielsen,93 an ambiguous agreement could 
not provide sufficient contractual basis.94 
The Court’s primary basis for its decision was that, because 
class arbitration is so different from individualized arbitration and 
undermines the benefits of individual arbitration, the FAA requires 
more than ambiguity to ensure the parties actually agreed to class 
arbitration.95 The majority began by pointing out that the FAA re-
quires the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 1414–15. 
 91 Id. (“In California, an agreement is ambiguous ‘when it is capable of two 
or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” (quoting Varela v. Lamps 
Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 771 F. App’x 418 
(9th Cir. 2019) (mem.)). 
 92 Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 
U.S. 662, 684 (2010)). 
 93 See generally 559 U.S. at 684 (“[A] party may not be compelled under 
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for con-
cluding that the party agreed to do so.”). 
 94 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 95 Id. 
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terms.96 Usually, the Court stated, courts can accomplish this by 
relying on state contract law.97 However, if the state law interferes 
or “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA,” then the state law is 
preempted by the Act.98 The Court framed the present issue as the 
conflict between the California state contract law regarding ambi-
guity and a fundamental principle of the FAA, “namely, that arbi-
tration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’”99 According to the 
Court, courts and arbitrators aspire to carry out parties’ inten-
tions.100 To do so, the majority remarked, the decision maker must 
recognize the “‘fundamental’ difference” between class arbitration 
and the traditional, individual arbitration “envisioned by the 
FAA.”101 The majority framed individual arbitration as a process 
that parties agree to in order to enjoy the benefits of private dispute 
resolution.102 These benefits, the Court said, are “lower costs, 
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adju-
dicators to resolve specialized disputes.”103 In contrast, the majori-
ty saw class arbitration as lacking those benefits, “sacrific[ing] the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and mak[ing] 
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate proce-
dural morass than final judgment.”104 The Court, following its pre-
vious reasoning from Stolt-Nielsen, concluded that, “because of 
these ‘crucial differences’ between individual and class arbitra-
tion . . . there [wa]s ‘reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 
(2011)). 
 99 Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
681 (2010)). 
 100 Id. at 1416. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685). 
 104 Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 
(2011)); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (noting 
that, with class proceedings, “the virtues Congress originally saw in arbitration, 
its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness, would be shorn away and arbitra-
tion would wind up looking like the litigation it was meant to displace”). 
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resolve disputes through classwide arbitration.’”105 Thus, like the 
silence that was found insufficient in Stolt-Nielsen, ambiguity did 
not provide a sufficient contractual basis for the Court to conclude 
that the parties agreed to give up the benefits of individual arbitra-
tion and to permit class arbitration proceedings.106 
The majority’s decision rests on the FAA’s preemption of the 
California contract law.107 The California law at issue was based 
on the doctrine of contra proferentem.108 The majority explained 
that the rule was one of “last resort,” applied only once other forms 
of interpretation were exhausted.109 In addition, the rule resolves 
an ambiguity on the basis of public policy factors rather than the 
parties’ intentions.110 Because the rule is used when a court cannot 
determine the intentions of the parties, the Court reasoned that the 
use of this doctrine to permit class arbitration is “inconsistent with 
‘the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of con-
sent.’”111 The Court also noted that it did not matter that the doc-
trine applied with equal force to all types of contracts as long as 
the doctrine interfered with the fundamental attributes of arbitra-
tion and the purpose of the FAA.112 The FAA, the Court remarked, 
provides the default rule for resolving contractual ambiguities in 
arbitration agreements.113 
Thus, the majority concluded that ambiguity in an arbitration 
agreement does not constitute a sufficient contractual basis to find 
consent to class arbitration and that the doctrine of contra 
 
 105 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–
867). 
 106 See id. at 1416–17. 
 107 See id. at 1417–19. 
 108 Id. at 1417. 
 109 Id. (quoting 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 at 268–70 (1960)). 
 110 Id. 
 111 See id. at 1418 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 
1623 (2018) (“[C]ourts may not allow a [state] contract defense to reshape tradi-
tional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures 
without the parties’ consent.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333, 348 (2011) (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [a state 
law] rather than consen[t], is inconsistent with the FAA.”). 
 112 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 113 Id. at 1419. 
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proferentem could not be used as a substitute for an affirmative 
contractual basis showing that the parties agreed to class proceed-
ings.114 
C. The Concurring Opinion 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s 
application of FAA precedent, although he read the arbitration 
agreement as silent and only contemplating bilateral arbitration.115 
He wrote separately, however, to note his continued skepticism of 
the Court’s implied preemption of state law where, as here, the 
state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.”116 
D. The Dissenting Opinions 
1. JUSTICE GINSBURG 
Although she joined Justice Kagan’s dissent in full, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize the Court’s divergence 
from the FAA’s fundamental principle that “arbitration is a matter 
of consent, not coercion.”117 Justice Ginsburg pointed out not only 
that the intention was for the Act to serve a limited purpose but 
also that it was not meant to be used for contracts where one party 
has limited bargaining power, such as in consumer and employ-
ment contracts.118 She pointed out that the effect of the Court ap-
 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1419–20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 116 Id. at 1420 (quoting id. at 1415 (majority opinion)); see also Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“My review of this 
Court’s broad implied pre-emption precedents, particularly its ‘purposes and 
objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence, has increased my concerns that implied 
pre-emption doctrines have not always been constitutionally applied. Under the 
vague and ‘potentially boundless’ doctrine of ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-
emption . . . the Court has pre-empted state law based on its interpretation of 
broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of 
congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law.” 
(citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907–08 (2000) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting))). 
 117 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010)). 
 118 See id.  
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plying the FAA to these contracts has been to impose mandatory 
arbitration on employees and consumers with “no genuine choice 
in the matter.”119 It also precluded these individuals from being 
able to come together to seek remedies as a class.120 As a conse-
quence, she noted, employees and consumers are faced with obsta-
cles in obtaining relief, especially in circumstances where the sit-
uation “cries out for collective treatment” precisely because indi-
vidual claims would be costly to bring, like in the present case.121 
Justice Ginsburg called out the “irony of invoking ‘the first princi-
ple’ that ‘arbitration is strictly a matter of consent’ to justify im-
posing individual arbitration on employees who surely would not 
choose to proceed solo,” and she concluded that immediate con-
gressional action was necessary to correct the Court’s expansion of 
the FAA.122 
2. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 
In her brief dissent, Justice Sotomayor asserted that the “Court 
went wrong years ago in concluding that a ‘shift from bilateral ar-
bitration to class-action arbitration’ imposes such ‘fundamental 
changes’ that class-action arbitration ‘is not arbitration as envi-
sioned by’” the FAA.123 She also disagreed with the Court’s 
preemption of the state law and noted that the Court should not 
have acted so hastily to preempt a “neutral principle of state con-
 
 119 See id. at 1420–21. 
 120 See id. (“The Court has relied on the FAA . . . to deny to employees and 
consumers ‘effective relief against powerful economic entities.’ Arbitration 
clauses, the Court has decreed, may preclude judicial remedies even when sub-
mission to arbitration is made a take-it-or-leave-it condition of employment or is 
imposed on a consumer given no genuine choice in the matter.” (quoting 
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing))). 
 121 See id. at 1421. 
 122 Id. at 1421–22 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 1415–16 (majority opin-
ion)). 
 123 Id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010); and 
then quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)). 
2020] DARK TIMES AHEAD FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 275 
 
tract law” without making sure that the preemption was truly nec-
essary.124 
3.  JUSTICE KAGAN 
As one of the few Justices who viewed the agreement as clear-
ly permitting class arbitration, Justice Kagan began her dissent by 
focusing on specific phrases of the arbitration agreement at is-
sue.125 In her view, the terms and phrases used in the agreement 
were broad enough to cover both individual and class arbitra-
tion.126 
However, Justice Kagan pointed out that, even if the Court was 
correct about the contract’s ambiguity, applying the “plain-vanilla 
rule of contract interpretation, applied in California as in every 
other State,” should have yielded the simple result of permitting 
class arbitration.127 In Justice Kagan’s view, the “anti-drafter can-
on” is exactly the kind of state contract rule that the FAA contem-
plates will control interpretations of arbitration clauses.128 She 
highlighted previous decisions where the Court itself had pointed 
out that the proper course was for the Court to apply state contract 
principles except where they discriminated against arbitration 
agreements.129 Where a state contract law treated arbitration 
 
 124 Id. at 1427–28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This Court normally acts 
with great solicitude when it comes to the possible pre-emption of state law, but 
the majority today invades California contract law without pausing to address 
whether its incursion is necessary. Such haste is as ill advised as the new federal 
common law of arbitration contracts it has begotten.” (citation omitted)). 
 125 See id. at 1428–29 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 126 See id. For example, Justice Kagan construed the phrase “any and all 
disputes, claims, or controversies” as “encompass[ing] both their individual and 
their class variants.” Id. at 1428. The employee’s class arbitration was a “‘dis-
pute, claim or controversy’ that belonged in arbitration.” Id. at 1429. Similarly, 
the agreement stated that arbitration “shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or 
other civil legal proceedings relating to [the employee’s] employment.” Id. Jus-
tice Kagan interpreted these phrases from the agreement as allowing arbitration 
of any kind of action that could have been brought in court. See id. at 1428–29. 
 127 Id. at 1428. 
 128 See id. at 1430–31. 
 129 See id. (“[T]he construction of those contractual terms . . . is ‘a question 
of state law, which this Court does not sit to review . . . .’ [e]xcept when state 
contract law discriminates against arbitration agreements.” (quoting Volt Info. 
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agreements worse off than other contracts, it would be preempted 
because it would stand as an obstacle to achieving the FAA’s pur-
pose of placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as all 
other contracts.130 But in this case, Justice Kagan noted that the 
anti-drafter rule is neutral, does not attempt to subtly target arbitra-
tion agreements, and applies and treats all conceivable contracts 
the same.131 
Justice Kagan concluded that the only basis for the majority’s 
holding was its hostility towards class arbitration.132 It was only 
because this case involved class arbitration, she argued, that the 
majority ignored the parties’ contract and neutral default rule and 
preempted the state law.133 Justice Kagan concluded that the Court 
“should instead—as the FAA contemplates—have left the parties’ 
agreement, as construed by state law, alone.”134 
III. COMMENT ON THE LAMPS PLUS DECISION 
A. A Look at the Legislative History and the Court’s Hostility 
Towards Class Arbitration 
The Lamps Plus decision is an unfortunate continuation of the 
Court’s hostility towards class arbitration that has been the basis 
for many previous decisions.135 A majority of the Court has criti-
 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 
(1989))); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009) 
(“Neither [Section 2 nor Section 3 of the FAA] purports to alter background 
principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements . . . .”). 
 130 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Kindred 
Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2017) (“The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act . . . requires courts to place arbitration agreements ‘on equal footing 
with all other contracts.’” (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 
468 (2015))). 
 131 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The anti-
drafter rule . . . takes no side—favors no outcome—as between class and indi-
vidualized dispute resolution.”). 
 132 See id. at 1435. 
 133 See id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See id.; Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 3 AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 91, 111 (2019) [hereinafter Szalai, Arbitration 
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cized class arbitration as fundamentally different from individual-
ized arbitration136 and has painted a picture of class arbitration that 
has allowed the Court to use the preemption doctrine wherever 
possible to not permit class proceedings. According to the majori-
ty, class arbitration stands in stark contrast to the cheap, fast, and 
personalized individual arbitration proceedings that the majority 
believes the FAA was designed for.137 In the majority’s view, in-
formality is the biggest advantage of arbitration, and that ad-
vantage must be preserved at all costs.138 To support these asser-
tions, the majority has plucked from the sparse legislative history 
some indication that members of Congress were aware of the pos-
sible financial and efficiency advantages of arbitration.139 This, 
 
Docket] (“The Lamps Plus decision and the Court’s other class arbitration cases 
are not really about arbitration at all; instead, these cases are best understood as 
reflecting the desire of certain justices to dismantle class actions.”). For exam-
ples of this hostility toward class arbitration, see generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011). 
 136 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (“[I]t is important to recognize the 
‘fundamental’ difference between class arbitration and the individualized form 
of arbitration envisioned by the FAA.” (quoting Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 
1622–23)). 
 137 See id. (describing benefits of individualized arbitration as “lower costs, 
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to 
resolve specialized disputes” (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010))). Some commentators have also noted that this 
view of individual arbitration as efficient and less costly can also help explain 
the Court’s hostility towards litigation, which is described as slow and ineffi-
cient. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 1119, 1141 (2019). This view is consistent with the Lamps Plus 
Court’s portrayal of class arbitration as too litigation-like and the hostility of the 
Court towards the procedure. See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 138 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 139 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (“It is practically appropriate that the action 
should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costli-
ness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agree-
ments for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforcea-
ble.”); see also Bookman, supra note 137, at 1147–48 (“Relying on the FAA’s 
legislative history, the Court often states that the FAA was intended ‘to allow 
parties to avoid “the costliness and delays of litigation”’ because arbitration was 
supposed to ‘largely eliminate[]’ that cost and delay. The Court has now held in 
multiple contexts that this litigation-avoidance purpose prevails over Congress’s 
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however, appears to be the only support from the legislative history 
of the majority’s restrictive view of what arbitration is meant to 
be.140 
First, the legislative record and many commentators suggest 
that Congress enacted the FAA for the limited purpose of pushing 
back against the judicial hostility towards arbitration existing at the 
time.141 The FAA was intended to fight against this hostility by 
making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable and by plac-
ing them on the same footing as all other contracts.142 This means 
that arbitration agreements were not meant to be elevated above 
other contracts—they were simply meant to be treated and en-
forced equally.143 The Court, however, through decisions such as 
Lamps Plus, has elevated arbitration agreements above other con-
tracts.144 Through the use of the preemption doctrine, the Court has 
 
intent in other statutes . . . to allow collective action and over many areas of state 
law.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974); and then quoting Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985))). 
 140 But see Imre S. Szalai, Aggregate Dispute Resolution: Class and Labor 
Arbitration, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399, 425–39 (2008) (discussing how 
there is nothing in legislative history indicating that Congress understood FAA 
as supporting a framework for class arbitration). 
 141 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2; Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 
135, at 106–07 (“The FAA was originally designed to be narrow in scope and 
applicability . . . . [T]he FAA was designed with a simple goal in mind: to re-
verse prior judicial hostility against the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses and to make such clauses as enforceable as other contract terms . . . .”). 
 142 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 at 1–2; Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, 
at 107. Many commentators have also noted that the FAA was supposed to be 
limited to claims involving parties of equal bargaining power, further raising 
doubt as to the Court’s expansion of the FAA. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, The 
Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 540 n.40 
(2014) [hereinafter Frankel, Super Contract]. 
 143 See Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 107 (noting that the 
drafters of the FAA did not want to make arbitration agreements more enforcea-
ble than other contracts); Wilson, supra note 22, at 100 (discussing that congres-
sional intent behind FAA was to place arbitration agreements on same footing as 
other contracts). 
 144 See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1146 (“The Court has described the 
FAA as embodying ‘a national policy favoring arbitration’ that does not just put 
arbitration contracts on equal footing with other kinds of contracts but seems to 
affirmatively favor arbitration over litigation.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting 
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singled out arbitration clauses for special treatment, setting them 
apart from other contracts.145 For example, as a result of the Lamps 
Plus decision, ambiguous arbitration agreements are not subject to 
the contra proferentem rule like other contracts because of the 
Court’s unwillingness to read the contract to permit class arbitra-
tion.146 Through such decisions, the Court has advanced a policy 
favoring arbitration instead of treating it equally.147 
Furthermore, although the majority is correct that there is evi-
dence that the Congress that considered the FAA was aware of the 
possible advantages of arbitration,148 the majority draws the wrong 
conclusion from this evidence. The fact that Congress recognized 
the potential benefits of arbitration does not mean they meant to 
restrict parties to only those forms of arbitration that use those 
benefits to the fullest.149 There is also little indication that the pos-
sible efficiency and cost advantages were intended to allow the 
Court to block the class arbitration procedure, or any other proce-
dural form of arbitration for that matter.150 The FAA itself is silent 
 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984))); see also Szalai, Arbitration 
Docket, supra note 135, at 108 (“Today, arbitration agreements are more en-
forceable than other contracts and benefit from special preferences and rules 
written not by Congress, but by the Court.”). 
 145 See Wilson, supra note 22, at 132–33 (arguing that FAA’s purpose of 
placing arbitration agreements on “equal footing as other contracts” was frus-
trated after Concepcion excluded arbitration agreements from “a generally ap-
plicable state law”). 
 146 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019); Hila Keren, 
Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequences of 
the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575, 598–99 (2020). 
 147 See Wilson, supra note 22, at 124–29 (discussing how the Court’s policy 
favoring arbitration is inconsistent with legislative intent to place arbitration 
agreements on equal footing with other contracts). 
 148 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2. 
 149 See Wilson, supra note 22, at 134 n.209 (noting that while Congress rec-
ognized potential benefits stemming from arbitration, “the legislative history 
does not support the conclusion that Congress envisioned any particular pro-
ceedings”). 
 150 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 360–61 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Wilson, supra note 22, at 133; see also S.I. STRONG, 
CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2013) (noting that it is unclear whether the tradition-
al model of bilateral arbitration is or has ever been true). 
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on the particular procedural form that arbitration must take.151 This 
silence has allowed arbitration to take on many different disputes 
in many different procedural forms, not just the bilateral arbitration 
form that the majority paints as the ideal picture of arbitration.152 
And even if class arbitrations may be more lengthy and expensive 
than individualized arbitration,153 that should not be a reason to 
throw away a potentially useful procedural option. In his dissent in 
AT&T Mobility, Justice Breyer correctly pointed out that instead of 
comparing bilateral and class arbitration, we should be comparing 
class arbitration and regular class actions.154 That argument is still 
valid here. Using this comparison, class arbitration is the more 
streamlined, efficient process as compared to class action litiga-
tion.155 Class arbitrations provide the same, as well as unique, ben-
efits to the parties.156 The parties are still allowed to structure the 
proceeding in their agreement, pick and choose which procedural 
rules to follow, select a specialized arbitrator, and so on.157 Just 
like individual arbitration, class arbitration can be made less formal 
 
 151 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; see also Resnik, supra note 14, at 2890 (“The 
FAA’s text . . . provided no descriptions of the form that arbitrations were to 
have. The Court imputed one through a purposive interpretation, inflected with 
assessments of the costs and benefits of class actions.”). 
 152 See Resnik, supra note 14, at 2892 (“The 1925 statute’s silence as to form 
reflects its historical context, authorizing enforcement when the practice was 
nascent and leaving ample room for arbitration’s evolution, in use today for a 
range of disputes from high stakes, heavily lawyered, expensive commercial 
conflicts to family dissolutions.”); Wilson, supra note 22, at 135–36 (discussing 
how modern arbitration practices do not necessarily fit Court’s description of 
inexpensive and streamlined arbitration). Some research also indicates that arbi-
tration is not actually cheaper or more efficient than litigation. See Wilson, su-
pra note 22, at 136 n.219. 
 153 See Gregory M. Bentz & Phillip Zeeck, Concerned About Class Arbitra-
tion? Check Your Agreement, NAT. L. REV. (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/concerned-about-class-arbitration-check-
your-agreement. 
 154 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 363 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 155 See id.; see also Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. 
L. REV. 419, 420 (2013). 
 156 See Troum, supra note 155, at 420, 427–28. 
 157 See id. 
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compared to litigating a class action.158 Or, just like with individual 
arbitration, parties can choose to forgo all of the “benefits” and 
make their proceedings more formal.159 Unfortunately, the majori-
ty of the Court continues to incorrectly restrict arbitration to the 
“efficient” bilateral form without much justification.160 
In addition, in some circumstances, class arbitration proceed-
ings may even be more efficient and streamlined than individual-
ized arbitration.161 These are usually circumstances where there are 
large numbers of potential claimants with a common injury.162 
Companies and employers that seek to dismiss class actions usual-
ly hope and believe that most consumers or employees will aban-
don their claims—for example, because of financial reasons—
thereby decreasing the number of arbitrations they have to de-
fend.163 Recently, however, there have been circumstances where 
potential class members and their attorneys have refused to aban-
don their claims and fought back against employers that demanded 
 
 158 See id. 
 159 See id. at 427–28 (“Parties can choose a specialist to be their arbitrator, 
but they need not; they may want privacy, but they may also seek celebri-
ty . . . . [F]ormality may be desired in some arbitration contexts, or not; and it is 
not uncommon for litigants to make strategic decisions that will cause a case to 
move more quickly (or slowly) when it is in their interest.”). 
 160 See Keren, supra note 146, at 594 (arguing that, in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice 
Alito failed to provide any supporting authority for his assertion that “class-
action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration” and that there are great dif-
ferences between the procedures (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp, 559 U.S. 662, 685–87 (2010))). 
 161 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 363 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] single class proceeding is surely more efficient 
than thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy 
resolution of disputes were all that mattered, then the [state] rule would rein-
force, not obstruct, that objective of the Act.”); Bookman, supra note 137, at 
1153 (“If efficiency is the goal, class arbitration can be more efficient than indi-
vidualized arbitration in contexts that are likely to generate large numbers of 
claims.”). 
 162 See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Impli-
cations of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1726–27 
(2006) [hereinafter Weston, Universes Colliding]. 
 163 See Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 679, 695 (2018). 
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individual arbitration.164 For example, Uber and Lyft have recently 
found themselves overwhelmed with arbitration costs and fees 
when thousands of their employees filed individual arbitration peti-
tions after their class actions were dismissed in court.165 Now, 
these companies are facing thousands of potential individual arbi-
tration claims instead of one consolidated claim, with the employ-
ees already seeking a court order to compel the companies to pay 
the arbitration fees so that the cases may proceed.166 And this is not 
the first example of employees seeking to force their employer’s 
hand or of employers realizing individual arbitration can prove to 
be a costly endeavor.167 In such cases, the majority’s argument that 
 
 164 See, e.g., Jessica Goodheart, Why 24 Hour Fitness Is Going to the Mat 
Against Its Own Employees, FAST CO. (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40543580/why-24-hour-fitness-is-going-to-the-
mat-against-its-own-employees; Alison Frankel, ‘This Hypocrisy Will Not Be 
Blessed’: Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims, 
REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-otc-doordash/this-hypocrisy-will-not-be-blessed-judge-orders-
doordash-to-arbitrate-5000-couriers-claims-idUSKBN2052S1. 
 165 See Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might 
Have Come up the Loser, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2019, 10:22 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-arbitration-miscalculation-
20190508-story.html (discussing how more than 60,000 employee drivers have 
filed arbitration demands against Uber in the United States and estimating that it 
will cost Uber $600 million to deal with these cases); Charlotte Garden, Uber 
and Lyft Drivers Turn the Tables on Individual Arbitration, ONLABOR (Jan. 8, 
2019), https://onlabor.org/uber-and-lyft-drivers-turn-the-tables-on-individual-
arbitration/. 
 166 See Alison Frankel, Forced into Arbitration, 12,500 Drivers Claim Uber 
Won’t Pay Fees to Launch Cases, REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:58 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber/forced-into-arbitration-
12500-drivers-claim-uber-wont-pay-fees-to-launch-cases-idUSKBN1O52C6. 
 167 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, From the 11th Circuit, a Cautionary Tale for 
Employers Imposing Arbitration on Workers, REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Aug. 9, 
2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-epic/from-the-11th-
circuit-a-cautionary-tale-for-employers-imposing-arbitration-on-workers-
idUSKBN1KU2GF (discussing Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors Inc., 898 F. 3d 
1301 (11th Cir. 2018), a case where an employer faced more than $100,000 in 
arbitration fees after successfully dismissing a class action suit); Daniel 
Wiessner, Arbitration Bid by 10,000 Postmates Drivers Not a ‘De Facto Class 
Action’ – Judge, REUTERS LEGAL (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/
article/employment-postmates/arbitration-bid-by-10000-postmates-drivers-not-a
-de-facto-class-action-judge-idUSL1N2C41ZD. 
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bilateral arbitration is more cost effective and streamlined falls 
apart. So why are class arbitrations not allowed to be part of the 
efficient and streamlined procedures that the FAA apparently envi-
sioned? Why are 1,300 potential arbitration proceedings by the 
Lamps Plus’s employees more “efficient” than one class action? 
Perhaps it is the Court’s way of limiting all types of class proceed-
ings168 or is simply a result of the Court’s pro-business ap-
proach.169 Either way, these examples demonstrate the inconsisten-
cy of the Court’s assertion that class arbitration is always the more 
inefficient option.170 Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions “catalog-
ing . . . class arbitration’s many sins”171 have led to a vision of 
class arbitration that is unmanageable and highly inefficient. This 
approach, however, ignores the potential usefulness of class pro-
ceedings for certain disputes where, as in Lamps Plus, the particu-
lar circumstances “cr[y] out for collective treatment.”172 
The majority also argues that arbitration is not designed for 
class proceedings,173 but this argument is questionable as well. 
Class arbitrations have, and hopefully will, continue to occur in the 
United States, demonstrating the ability and utilization of the pro-
cedure to solve certain disputes.174 In addition, arbitral tribunals 
 
 168 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1435 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 169 See generally Keren, supra note 146 (discussing effect of neoliberalism 
and resulting pro-corporation arbitration jurisprudence). 
 170 See David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and 
Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L. J. 1323, 1370–71 (2019) [hereinafter 
Horton, Clause Construction] (“[Some] judges have observed that class actions 
are a mere procedural device that leaves the ‘parties’ legal rights and duties 
intact and the rules of decision unchanged.’ These courts have therefore held 
that ‘the shift from multiple bilateral arbitrations to a single class arbitration 
does nothing to alter a defendant’s potential aggregate liability.’” (footnote 
omitted) (first quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 
559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010); and then quoting Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc. 376 
P.3d 506, 520 (Cal. 2016))). 
 171 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1435 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 172 See id. at 1421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); infra Section III.C. 
 173 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 174 See Class Action Case Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://apps.adr.org/
CaseDocketApp/faces/CaseSearchPage.jsf;jsessionid=kspaG_Y5HGaIeks5ZOt
yNeJ90GrKPpPQjAYV6DE7dR7lZrxFp3is!1032178906 (last visited Nov. 18, 
2020). 
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have been utilized to deal with different forms of multiparty arbi-
tration, showing that arbitration can adapt and handle different 
kinds of disputes.175 Furthermore, many standard arbitration rules 
contain specific rules for class arbitration proceedings, which raise 
doubt as to the argument that arbitration cannot be designed and 
structured to support a class proceeding.176 The majority does raise 
a valid point as to the due process concerns in regard to class arbi-
tration and absent members.177 Similarly, some commentators have 
argued that class actions are inherently incompatible with arbitra-
tion proceedings because they seem to have a “preclusive effect on 
absent . . . class members,” which is incompatible with the notion 
that arbitrators possess only the authority granted to them by the 
parties in the dispute.178 However, these due process concerns may 
be better addressed through changes to the class arbitration proce-
dure, not by placing more obstacles in the way of class arbitration 
in the first place. For example, greater notice requirements or 
changes to the institutional rules,179 such as establishing uniform 
class arbitration rules or guidelines, may be better at addressing the 
 
 175 See STRONG, supra note 150, at 110, 167–68 (noting that arbitration 
community has been conducting multiparty proceedings for some time and that 
large-scale proceedings resemble traditional multiparty actions). See also id. at 
167 (“[C]laims that class, mass, and collective arbitration are in some way fun-
damentally different from other forms of arbitration are unfounded, factually 
and legally.”). 
 176 See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary_
Rules_for_Class_Arbitrations.pdf. 
 177 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (“[C]lass arbitration . . . raises serious 
due process concerns by adjudicating the rights of absent members of the plain-
tiff class . . . with only limited judicial review.”). 
 178 See Troum, supra note 155, at 421. 
 179 For example, after the Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), the American Arbitration Association 
established rules dictating that “clause construction” awards, which were issued 
by an arbitrator deciding whether a silent arbitration agreement permitted class 
proceedings, were to be published and contain a written reasoning of the deci-
sion. See AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N, (July 14, 2005) 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA-Policy-on-
Class-Arbitrations.pdf; AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS Rule 3 (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/
Supplementary_Rules_for_Class_Arbitrations.pdf. 
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due process concerns.180 With equally valid concerns on both sides 
of this issue, congressional action is necessary to address this spe-
cific issue. Modifying the procedural requirements may be the only 
way to both protect absent class members and preserve the class 
arbitration procedure, which is something that Congress could ac-
complish with an FAA amendment or a separate statute. 
The consequences of the Lamps Plus decision, however, are 
not limited to just denying class proceedings to this group of em-
ployees or just continuing the Court’s flawed class arbitration ju-
risprudence. As the next Section discusses, the majority, without 
any real consideration about the necessity of such preemption,181 
preempted a neutral state law for the sole purpose of not backing 
down on class arbitration. 
B. Preemption of contra proferentem 
Lamps Plus could have been a very straightforward decision. 
The Court could have agreed with the concurrence’s reading of the 
agreement and held that the agreement only permitted individual 
arbitration.182 Or the Court could have read the arbitration clause 
as unambiguously permitting class arbitration, as the dissent did.183 
Under either reading, the result would have then been clear under 
the reasoning of Stolt-Nielsen.184 The Court, instead, chose to 
 
 180 See generally Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1732–42 
(discussing different approaches used in class arbitration in the United States). 
 181 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor points out the Court reaches its conclu-
sion without actually deciding for itself that the agreement is ambiguous. Lamps 
Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The majority could have 
avoided preemption by reading the contract as unambiguous like the concur-
rence did. See id. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring). Nevertheless, even while 
deferring to the lower court’s reading, the Court should have paused before 
preempting a state law and encroaching on the state law domain. Id. at 1428 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Kristopher Kleiner, Comment, AT&T Mo-
bility L.L.C. v. Concepcion: The Disappearance of the Presumption Against 
Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (2012) 
(arguing that FAA preemption doctrine “deviates from the fundamental princi-
ples of federalism”). 
 182 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 183 See id. at 1428–29 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 184 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 
(2010). 
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adopt the lower court’s interpretation of the agreement as ambigu-
ous.185 As Justice Kagan argued, the conclusion still should have 
been straightforward—apply the state contract law principle of 
contra proferentem.186 Doing so would certainly have been con-
sistent with the general presumption against preemption of state 
laws.187 It would also have been consistent with Stolt-Nielsen, 
where the Court did not explicitly say that express authorization 
was required to permit class arbitration.188 Had the Court followed 
the state rule and adopted the reading of the employee, class arbi-
tration would have been permitted.189 The majority, however, 
chose to go down a much different route and once again invoked 
the preemption doctrine.190 
The Lamps Plus majority’s preemption of the neutral state con-
tract principle of contra proferentem191 is perhaps the most con-
cerning part of this decision. The anti-drafter rule is applied to an 
ambiguous contract as a “last resort,” where other rules of interpre-
tation have failed to extract the meaning of the contract.192 It is 
only applied where an ambiguity exists and only “[a]fter the court 
has examined all of the other factors that affect the search for the 
parties’ intended meaning, including general, local, technical and 
trade usages and custom, and including the evidence of relevant 
circumstances which must be admitted and weighed.”193 This rule 
 
 185 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 186 See id. at 1430 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 187 Some commentators have argued that Court’s FAA preemption doctrine 
interferes with state laws and is inconsistent with general presumption against 
preemption. See, e.g., Kleiner, supra note 181, at 760–66. 
 188 See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 n.10. 
 189 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1430 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 190 See id. at 1417–19 (majority opinion). 
 191 See id. 
 192 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. 
Perillo, ed. 1998) [hereinafter CORBIN]. But see David Horton, Flipping the 
Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 
431, 436 (2009) [hereinafter Horton, Flipping the Script] (“Historically, contra 
proferentem had been a last resort . . . . However, the version that governed 
standard-form contracts was markedly different. Rather than being the last step 
of the interpretive process, it was the first. Rather than being a tie-breaker, it was 
dispositive.” (footnote omitted)). 
 193 CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27. 
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dictates that a court reasonably interpret the ambiguous terms 
against the party who supplied or drafted them.194 The language is 
interpreted against the drafter because the drafter, more so than 
other parties, knows of any ambiguities and usually benefits from 
the ambiguous language.195 
The Court’s preemption of this doctrine is both intriguing and 
worrying. There is arguably good reason and basis to preempt state 
contract rules that explicitly or subtly discriminate or single out 
arbitration contracts.196 These rules, as the Court asserts, under-
mine the purpose of the FAA and legislative intent to ensure that 
arbitration agreements are enforceable and placed on the same 
footing as all other contracts.197 However, based on section 2 of the 
FAA, there is also a good basis for the Court to leave alone state 
 
 194 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. L. 
INST. 1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates 
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds.”). 
 195 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a. The Supreme 
Court itself has recognized the contra proferentem rule in Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which also involved an 
arbitration agreement. See also id. at 62–63 (“Moreover, respondents cannot 
overcome the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should 
construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted 
it. Respondents drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now claim the 
benefit of the doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect the party who did not 
choose the language from an unintended or unfair result. That rationale is well 
suited to the facts of this case. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that peti-
tioners were actually aware of New York’s bifurcated approach to punitive 
damages, or that they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to 
arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive right. In the 
face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this intent to petitioners.” (foot-
note omitted) (citations omitted)). 
 196 See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64 
(discussing FAA’s preemptive power based on the Commerce Clause); Shane 
Blank, Note, Concerning Preemption: Upholding Consent Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 281, 284–85 (2012). 
 197 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011); 
see also Kleiner, supra note 181, at 748–52 (discussing preemption doctrine and 
FAA). 
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law rules that apply equally to all contracts and do not favor or 
disfavor arbitration agreements.198 
Contra proferentem is one such state contract principle. The 
principle applies equally and uniformly to all sorts of contracts 
where an ambiguity exists in the language and the court cannot 
ascertain the intent of the parties any other way.199 The rule also 
does not in any way discriminate against or target, expressly or 
subtly, arbitration agreements as compared to other contracts.200 
For example, unlike in Concepcion, where a class action waiver 
ban would have applied more broadly to arbitration agreements as 
opposed to other contracts,201 the anti-drafter rule does not lean 
one way or the other.202 Additionally, the anti-drafter rule does not 
presuppose any single outcome—certainly not the outcome that 
class arbitration will always be allowed.203 As noted by Justice 
Kagan in her dissent, had the employee drafted the contract, the 
rule would have directed the Court to interpret the agreement 
against the employee, thus preventing class arbitration.204 Al-
 
 198 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (“The FAA 
requires courts to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’ Al-
though courts may ordinarily accomplish that end by relying on state contract 
principles, state law is preempted to the extent it ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.” 
(citations omitted) (first quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 
(2018); and then quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352)); see also id. at 1431 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the FAA . . . ‘purports to alter background 
principles of state contract law regarding’ the scope or content of agreements.” 
(quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009))). 
 199 See CORBIN, supra note 192 § 24.27; see also Jeffrey Gordon & Paul 
Sullivan, Contra Proferentem Doesn’t Always Mean ‘Against the Insurer’, JD 
SUPRA (July 21, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/contra-proferentem-
doesn-t-always-mean-89102/. 
 200 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Sandquist 
v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016). 
 201 See 563 U.S. at 341. But see Wilson, supra note 22, at 137 (arguing that 
Discover Bank rule was a “generally applicable state law” and that it did not 
“target arbitration”). 
 202 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1432 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id.; cf. id. at 1432 n.5 (“Similarly, if Lamps Plus, as the agreement’s au-
thor, had wanted class arbitration (perhaps because that would resolve many 
related cases at once) and Varela had resisted it (perhaps because he thought his 
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though that would be an unlikely scenario, it nevertheless shows 
that the rule neither discriminates nor favors arbitration.205 It is 
curious, then, that the Court so hastily preempted such a neutral 
and widely used state contract rule that seems to agree with both 
section 2 of the FAA and the Court’s previous precedent.206 One of 
the dissenters offers perhaps the only good reason for the majori-
ty’s preemption––namely, that this case involved class arbitration 
and that the Court is willing to preempt even a neutral state law to 
prevent a class proceeding.207 The majority justifies its preemption 
by pointing out that the rule uses public policy factors to resolve 
ambiguities in contracts, instead of focusing on the parties’ in-
tent.208 Even so, the rule is potentially useful in interpreting some 
agreements where the court can draw a reasonable interpretation of 
the agreement and where an actual ambiguity exists.209 By side-
 
case better than the others), the anti-drafter rule would have prevented, rather 
than permitted, class arbitration.”). 
 205 See id. 
 206 See id. at 1432 (“[The] Court has itself used the anti-drafter canon to 
interpret an arbitration agreement. In that case . . . the rule’s through-and-
through neutrality made preemption unthinkable.”); Weston, The Accidental 
Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 60 (discussing how FAA explicitly con-
templates laws of general applicability that include state contract law defenses). 
 207 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1428 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority can 
reach the opposite conclusion only by insisting that the FAA trumps that neutral 
state rule whenever its application would result in class arbitration.”); see also 
Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 63 (noting that 
“significant judicial vacatur” of arbitration awards occurs in the form of preemp-
tion of state laws that are “deemed rarely in direct conflict with arbitration, but 
merely ‘anti-arbitration’”). 
 208 Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417; see also CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27 
(“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its application does not 
assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or even 
the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the language used. 
It is chiefly a rule of policy, generally favoring the underdog. It directs the court 
to choose between two or more possible reasonable meanings on the basis of 
their legal operation, i.e., whether they favor the drafter or the other party. 
As . . . Restatement (Second) of Contracts comment [a] on [Section 206] entitled 
‘Interpretation Against the Draftsman’ explains, ‘It is in strictness a rule of legal 
effect, sometimes called construction, as well as interpretation; its operation 
depends on the position of the parties as they appear in litigation . . . .’”). 
 209 See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 555 (“Although some 
authorities have said that the doctrine should be used as a ‘last resort’ when 
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stepping the rule, the Court merely ignores the parties’ agreement 
for its own policy preference against class arbitrations.210 
It is unfortunate that the majority would so readily substitute its 
policy judgment for a long-standing contract principle. As noted by 
Justice Kagan in her dissent, “[f]rom an ex ante perspective, the 
[contra proferentem] rule encourages the drafter to set out its intent 
in clear contractual language, for the other party then to see and 
agree to.”211 In other words, maintaining the applicability of the 
anti-drafter rule to arbitration agreements would encourage em-
ployers and businesses to be clear in their drafting.212 This would 
likely result in drafters inserting explicit class arbitration waivers 
to prevent being forced to submit to class proceedings.213 And 
while this would, of course, conclusively prohibit employees and 
consumers from initiating class proceedings, at the very least, these 
parties would be better informed about what rights they have prior 
to signing the contracts.214 There is no good reason for imposing 
on these parties the burden of having to realize that, even in the 
absence of an explicit class action waiver, they are nevertheless 
prohibited from pursuing class arbitration.215 The explicit class 
waivers would place employees and consumers on notice that they 
are in fact waiving these rights, instead of leaving parties uncertain 
about their options or how a court will later interpret the con-
tract.216 In fact, this knowledge may indeed impact their decision to 
 
extrinsic evidence fails to resolve the ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is often una-
vailable in arbitration disputes, and the doctrine has been frequently applied to 
standard-form contracts of all types.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 210 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1435 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 211 Id. at 1434. 
 212 See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 555 (discussing how one 
of the main justifications of contra proferentem is that it “encourages greater 
clarity in contracts through better drafting”). 
 213 See Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note 192, at 437 (noting that con-
tra proferentem rule encourages “information flow by making the drafter spell 
out the parties’ rights and duties or suffer dire consequences”). 
 214 See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 560. 
 215 See id. at 560–61. 
 216 See id. (“There appears to be some evidence, particularly in the consumer 
context, that companies intentionally make their arbitration clauses difficult to 
understand so that consumers will not fully realize what rights they are giving 
up.”). 
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enter into the contract in the first place.217 The Court’s holding, 
however, allows employers and businesses to leave their contracts 
ambiguous with no fear of being dragged into a class proceed-
ing.218 Even with no explicit class waiver, the mere absence of ex-
press authorization of class arbitration is enough to block employ-
ees and consumers from engaging in class proceedings.219 The 
Lamps Plus decision places the burden on the employees and con-
sumers to realize that the ambiguous contract will preclude them 
from seeking relief in a class proceeding, something that employ-
ees and consumers should not be expected to do.220 
Furthermore, as Justice Kagan points out, “from an ex post per-
spective, the rule enables an interpreter to resolve any remaining 
uncertainty in line with the parties’ likely expectations.”221 As 
mentioned, an employee signing the contract, seeing no class ac-
tion waiver, likely does not expect that he would be barred from 
participating in a class proceeding.222 The employer, on the other 
hand, likely knew of the possibility of inserting a class action 
waiver, and still chose to proceed without one.223 A simple applica-
tion of the contra proferentem rule would warrant protecting the 
employee from the employer’s omission of the waiver, as the em-
 
 217 See id. 
 218 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019). 
 219 See id. 
 220 See id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Where, as here, an employ-
ment agreement provides for arbitration as a forum for all disputes relating to a 
person’s employment and the rules of that forum allow for class actions, an em-
ployee who signs an arbitration agreement should not be expected to realize that 
she is giving up access to that procedural device.”). 
 221 Id. at 1434 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see CORBIN, supra note 192, 
§ 24.27 (“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its application 
does not assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the 
words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the 
language used.”). 
 222 See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 560–61. 
 223 See Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note 192, at 437–38 (explaining 
that firms can use ambiguity in contracts strategically and how contra 
proferentem helps combat these “opportunistic incentives”). 
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ployee likely had no power or opportunity to negotiate to change 
the agreement.224 
The Lamps Plus Court took yet another step towards expanding 
the FAA’s preemptive powers. The question that remains is what 
state rules will the Court preempt next? One commentator has sug-
gested that the Court might seek to preempt procedural devices 
such as punitive damages or discovery.225 These procedural devic-
es, however, were likely already in danger of being undermined 
even before the Lamps Plus decision under the reasoning of Con-
cepcion.226 Consider, for example, a state law mandating discovery 
procedures similar to the ones used in federal district courts. They 
will likely be seen as too litigation-like for the Court, imposing 
procedural requirements on the arbitrators and the parties that are 
inconsistent with streamlined arbitration procedures—much like 
the class arbitration the Court was trying to prevent in Lamps 
Plus.227 The Court could also, although unlikely, see such discov-
ery as entirely consistent with private dispute resolution, reasoning 
that the parties likely intended to submit themselves to discovery in 
order to fully arbitrate their claims. It will be interesting to see how 
 
 224 See CORBIN, supra note 192 § 24.27 (“The ‘contra proferentem’ device is 
intended to aid a party whose bargaining power was less than that of the drafts-
person.”); see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of 
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964) (“[The contra proferentem rule] 
favors the party of lesser bargaining power, who has little or no opportunity to 
choose the terms of the contract, and perforce accepts one drawn by the stronger 
party.”). 
 225 See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1184 (“Lamps Plus leaves [an] open 
question[] about . . . what other ‘fundamental attributes’ of arbitration will next 
be held to trump ‘plain vanilla’ state contract law. Punitive damages and discov-
ery seem like potential contenders for features which, if used in arbitration, 
might be challenged as undermining the ‘essential virtues’ of arbitration.” (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1428–35 (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing))). 
 226 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2011) 
(discussing examples of state laws that would be preempted because they would 
disfavor arbitration, such as, for example, one finding agreements unconsciona-
ble that failed to provide for “judicially monitored discovery”). 
 227 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416. 
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courts will apply the Lamps Plus decision to such procedures in the 
future.228 
As mentioned, however, state laws involving things such as 
discovery procedures and punitive damages were probably already 
at risk before Lamps Plus under the reasoning of Concepcion and 
other related cases.229 More of a concern are other neutral contract 
principles, like contra proferentem, which previously seemed to be 
applicable to all arbitration agreements under the saving clause of 
section 2.230 These rules are unlike those addressed in, for exam-
ple, Concepcion, where the state law at issue would have more 
broadly impacted arbitration agreements.231 They were not de-
signed with an ulterior motive or policy aimed at limiting or con-
trolling arbitration agreements.232 Instead, neutral state contract 
rules are applied by courts to help interpret disputed contracts.233 
The Lamps Plus decision shows that the Court is willing to reason 
its way around these state rules to accomplish its policy goal of 
cutting back on class proceedings. If the Court can preempt the 
anti-drafter rule, what other basic rules of interpretation will see 
 
 228 See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64 n.29 
(discussing examples of laws of general applicability that were preempted be-
cause they affected arbitration). 
 229 See Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 165 (2014) (discussing how, after Concep-
cion, “any state contract law defense that conditions enforcement of an arbitra-
tion clause on some procedure that makes arbitration ‘more formal, costlier, or 
less efficient’ is preempted,” such as, for example, court-monitored discovery 
(quoting Arpan A. Sura & Robert A DeRise, Conceptualizing Conception: The 
Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 449 
(2013))). 
 230 See Wilson, supra note 22, at 107 (“The savings clause of section 2 pro-
motes the congressional purpose behind the FAA . . . because the savings clause 
ensures that, like other contracts, arbitration agreements are subject to all gener-
ally applicable contract defenses.”). 
 231 See supra note 201. 
 232 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (“[S]tate law is preempted to the ex-
tent it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011))). 
 233 See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27 (explaining how courts will 
use neutral state contract rule of contra proferentem to decide what meaning to 
give to a contract’s words). 
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themselves thrown out whenever class proceedings are at issue? 
Taking the FAA preemption doctrine to its extreme, could the 
Court not preempt basic rules, such as construing undefined terms 
according to industry custom or their common, ordinary meaning if 
such a rule would result in the authorization of class arbitration?234 
The only limit that can be extracted from the majority’s opinion is 
that the majority considered contra proferentem to be applying 
public policy factors and not actually interpreting the parties’ in-
tent.235 Perhaps this is one way that other neutral rules will be up-
held as applicable—if they are seen as actual rules of interpreta-
tion. The extent to which the Court is willing to go to prevent class 
arbitration is yet to be seen. In the meantime, the Court’s decision 
leaves all contracting parties in an uneasy limbo by making it less 
predictable as to which contract principles will apply to their 
agreements and which will be preempted.236 At the very least, 
businesses and employers can rest easy knowing that the Court will 
continue to expand the FAA to protect them from class arbitra-
tions.237 
C. Future Impact of Lamps Plus 
Lamps Plus expands the Stolt-Nielsen decision by placing fur-
ther requirements and restrictions on arbitration agreements and 
the parties that enter into them. Arbitration agreements will now 
require explicit authorization of class arbitration for a court to find 
that a party to the contract may pursue a claim through class pro-
ceedings.238 Nothing short of actual consent will allow parties to 
pursue class arbitration. 
 
 234 See id. § 24.13. 
 235 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (“[C]ontra proferentem resolves the 
ambiguity against the drafter based on public policy factors, primarily equitable 
consideration about the parties’ relative bargaining strength.”). 
 236 See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1160 (“Lamps Plus undermines parties’ 
expectations that general contract principles apply to arbitration contracts and 
replaces those principles with a federal common law of arbitration contracts.”). 
But see Kleiner, supra note 181, at 759–60 (explaining how a consistent line of 
“FAA preemption jurisprudence” provides businesses with more predictability 
and allows for easier drafting of agreements for multiple states). 
 237 See generally Keren, supra note 146. 
 238 See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417. 
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While this result is in line with the Court’s various holdings,239 
it will nonetheless have drastic consequences for the rights of em-
ployees and consumers.240 Some commentators have previously 
accused the Court of taking a pro-business stance on this issue, 
blocking class arbitration to protect the expectations of businesses 
and employers.241 The Lamps Plus decision is simply a continua-
tion of this stance. Because of this decision, many employees and 
consumers will not have access to class proceedings to vindicate 
small claims against employers and businesses, even where there is 
no explicit class arbitration waiver in the agreement.242 This is 
troublesome because class proceedings are often the only realistic 
way for individuals with small claims to seek relief. 243 Class ac-
tions are useful procedural devices where a large group of claim-
 
 239 See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 
687 (2010). 
 240 Some commentators have asserted that the FAA was not supposed to 
apply to employment or consumer contracts, marking yet another area of expan-
sion of the statute beyond what Congress intended. See Szalai, Arbitration 
Docket, supra note 135, at 108–09; Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal 
Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 117–18 
(2016) (“The history of the FAA’s enactment helps demonstrate that the FAA 
was originally intended to provide a framework for federal courts to support a 
limited, modest system of private dispute resolution for commercial disputes, 
not the expansive system that exists today involving both state and federal courts 
and covering virtually all types of non-criminal disputes . . . . Through my his-
torical research, I learned the statute was enacted to cover privately-negotiated 
arbitration agreements between merchants in order to facilitate the resolution of 
contractual disputes . . . . However, through decades of flawed interpretations, 
the Supreme Court has expanded the statute to force both state courts and feder-
al courts to acknowledge and compel arbitration of a wide variety of disputes, 
including complex statutory disputes of a public nature, consumer disputes, and 
employment disputes. Based on the history of the FAA’s enactment, it is clear 
that the statute was never intended to apply in state courts or cover employment 
disputes.”). 
 241 See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Con-
cepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 780–81 n.99 (2012) [hereinafter Weston, Death 
of Class Arbitration] (noting that businesses praised Concepcion decision). 
 242 See generally Keren, supra note 146 (discussing how Lamps Plus deci-
sion will further isolate employees by restricting their ability to proceed collec-
tively). 
 243 See Estlund, supra note 163, at 695. 
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ants has suffered some common injury.244 Through a class pro-
ceeding, these claimants can aggregate their claims and split the 
expenses of seeking relief.245 Without this procedural option, many 
individuals are simply unable to bring their claims due to the ex-
penses associated with individual arbitration.246 This results in the 
loss of these individuals’ ability to seek relief and thus effectively 
takes away their right to seek justice.247 In addition, class arbitra-
tion has more potential to fix the behavior that is harming the em-
ployees and consumers than a few individual claims, especially 
where most individuals with small claims have no financial incen-
tive or ability to bring them.248 Where employers and businesses 
can insert class arbitration waivers—or, after Lamps Plus, simply 
rely on ambiguous arbitration agreements—these arbitration claus-
es begin to look like exculpatory clauses, limiting the businesses’ 
liability.249 
 
 244 See Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1726–27. 
 245 See id.; Estlund, supra note 163, at 695. 
 246 Estlund, supra note 163, at 695 (“The problem for employees is that some 
legal claims cannot practicably be adjudicated on an individual basis. In particu-
lar, many FLSA wage and house claims involve incremental pay disparities over 
a few years; the cost of litigating them as an individual often exceeds the ex-
pected returns. But if many individuals are subject to the same challenged prac-
tice, as is often true, employees can practicably pursue their claims through a 
class or collective action.” (footnote omitted)). 
 247 See id. (“If employers have their way in the Supreme Court, they will be 
free to block . . . [class] actions, and to virtually nullify a large category of em-
ployee claims that are not viable on an individual basis, simply by requiring 
individual arbitration.”); Keren, supra note 146, at 584 (noting that prohibiting 
class arbitration “insulate[s] corporations from legal liability by preventing 
claimants from coming together—which is by and large their only viable path to 
redress”). 
 248 See Keren, supra note 146, at 586 (discussing effect of class waivers is to 
prevent individuals from addressing “corporate wrongdoing”); see also id. at 
592 (discussing Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as creating “a world in which as 
long as [corporations] cause smaller harms to numerous victims, no one will be 
able to hold them accountable”). 
 249 See Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 92 (“With this expan-
sive system of arbitration currently in place and the willingness of courts to 
compel arbitration where meaningful consent is lacking, corporate America and 
parties with disproportionate bargaining power can unilaterally and easily re-
move themselves from the traditional justice system through the use of arbitra-
tion clauses. The average person in America has lost access to the courthouse, 
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Furthermore, while class arbitration survives where it is ex-
pressly authorized by an arbitration agreement, there is little hope 
that employees or consumers will have access to this procedural 
option unless the employer or business drafting the contract per-
mits class arbitration.250 Employees and consumers will now have 
to negotiate for the inclusion of an explicit class arbitration author-
ization in the arbitration agreement. This, of course, is very unlike-
ly to happen in either the employment or consumer context, where 
arbitration clauses in contracts are usually of a take-it-or-leave-it 
nature.251 Employees, especially, are placed in a tough spot where 
the decision is between employment (with a binding arbitration 
clause that may preclude them from seeking relief in a class pro-
ceeding) and unemployment.252 And while employees may be in a 
better position than consumers to negotiate the contract terms, 
most employees likely lack the necessary bargaining power or lev-
erage to convince their employer to change the agreement to in-
clude a class arbitration procedure.253 Therefore, few employees, if 
 
and in its place, a virtually unregulated, unreviewable, expansive system of pri-
vatized justice now exists.”); Estlund, supra note 163, at 703 (“[T]he imposition 
of mandatory arbitration means that the employer faces only a miniscule chance 
of ever confronting a formal legal claim in any forum regarding future legal 
misconduct against its employees . . . . [S]uch a provision virtually amounts to 
an ex ante exculpatory clause, and an ex ante waiver of substantive rights that 
the law declares non-waivable.”). 
 250 See Keren, supra note 146, at 598 (arguing that there is “zero probability” 
that corporations will ever explicitly agree to class arbitration). 
 251 See Horton, Clause Construction, supra note 170, at 1370 (“Class actions 
invariably arise from adhesive consumer and employment contracts. In this mi-
lieu, there is no course of dealing . . . to analyze, and few plaintiffs will have 
even read or understood the disputed term. Therefore, as one arbitrator put it, the 
idea that the parties shared a common understanding of whether the agreement 
authorized class arbitration ‘is actually a fiction.’”). There has also been a bit of 
discussion about whether the FAA was intended to apply to such take-it-or-
leave-it contracts, further undermining the Court’s assertion that the parties to 
such contracts consent to waive their rights to class proceedings. See supra note 
240. 
 252 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1421 (2019) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (discussing employee’s “Hobson’s choice” in deciding whether to 
accept an employment contract with an arbitration clause). 
 253 See Resnik, supra note 14, at 2863–70. 
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any, will be able to secure the explicit class arbitration authoriza-
tion required by the Court in Lamps Plus. 
Fortunately, some hope remains for class arbitrations as some 
federal courts have distinguished Lamps Plus and permitted class 
proceedings. For example, in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., the 
Second Circuit upheld an arbitrator’s determination that the 
agreement at issue permitted class proceedings and that absent 
class members were bound by this determination.254 In its decision, 
the Second Circuit distinguished Lamps Plus by pointing out that, 
in that case, the question of class arbitration was submitted to the 
court, not to the arbitrator as in Jock.255 The Jock Court also point-
ed out that its decision was consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
previous ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, which also 
upheld an arbitrator’s determination that the contract permitted 
class arbitration.256 Therefore, at least where the parties agree to 
send the interpretation of the agreement to an arbitrator, there is 
some chance that a court will uphold the arbitrator’s authorization 
of class proceedings.257 
Nevertheless, just as Congress responded to judicial hostility 
towards arbitration when passing the FAA, it is now time for the 
legislature to respond to the modern Court’s hostility towards class 
arbitration. Many commentators, including some Justices, have 
called for congressional action to fix the confusion surrounding the 
FAA.258 Congressional action is certainly necessary to scale back 
the Court’s expansion of the FAA, as there is little prospect of the 
Court doing so on its own. There is also little hope for states being 
able to protect their residents due to the ever-expanding FAA 
preemption doctrine, which has now been used to invalidate all 
sorts of state legislation.259 Amending the FAA to expressly permit 
class arbitration is likely necessary to overcome the years of the 
 
 254 Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 255 See id. at 626. 
 256 See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013). 
 257 See id.; see also Ala. Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. Lazenby, 292 So. 3d 295, 
307–08 (Ala. 2019) (holding that an arbitrator did not exceed his power by find-
ing that class arbitration was available). 
 258 See, e.g., Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 124; Lamps Plus, 
Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 259 See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64. 
2020] DARK TIMES AHEAD FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 299 
 
Court’s hostility towards class proceedings. Doing so would be a 
significant step for employees who may be relying on the availabil-
ity of class proceedings to vindicate their rights. On the other hand, 
an amendment expressly banning or disfavoring class arbitration 
would also resolve the confusion surrounding class proceedings 
and would actually constitute the clear congressional intent that the 
Court has been grabbing at for years. Alternatively, the Court 
could simply scale back the FAA to its intended purpose of gov-
erning arbitration agreements between sophisticated parties and 
address arbitration in other sectors separately.260 This would allow 
the Court to be more precise as to its intent with regard to arbitra-
tion in specific circumstances, including the arbitration of em-
ployment disputes. 
Over the years, both Congress and federal agencies have made 
attempts at changing certain aspects of the FAA.261 However, these 
single pieces of legislation do not address the bigger issue created 
by FAA preemption, and more precise action is required specifical-
ly in regard to class arbitration.262 Further, if Congress intends to 
 
 260 Cf. Wilson, supra note 22, at 139 n.232 (giving examples of attempts of 
industry-specific amendments to FAA). In September 2019, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, which would 
“prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of future em-
ployment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes.” See Forced Arbitration 
Injustice Repeal Act H.R. 1423, 116 Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, Sept. 20, 
2019). This bill would pull back on the use of arbitration in sectors where the 
other party to the agreement has little bargaining power. See id. However, as of 
the date of this Comment, the Senate has not yet voted on the bill. See S.610 - 
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/610/actions (last visit-
ed Nov. 18, 2020). 
 261 See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing several 
bills introduced in the 115th Congress regarding mandatory arbitration agree-
ments); JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2003) (dis-
cussing some legislative bills aimed at mandatory arbitration such as one pro-
posing an amendment to FAA to address arbitration of employment disputes); 
Weston, Death of Class Arbitration, supra note 241, at 792–94 (discussing fed-
eral legislative action regarding mandatory arbitration). 
 262 See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 72 
(“Congress has enacted piecemeal legislation to address specific consumer pro-
tection and policy concerns.”). See also id. (“A clear statement by Congress 
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keep class arbitration alive, uniform class arbitration rules could 
benefit all parties by setting standards and preventing due process 
violations of parties’ rights, further mitigating any concerns the 
Court may have.263 
CONCLUSION 
Through its decision in Lamps Plus,264 the Court once again 
found a way to cut back on the availability of class arbitrations as a 
procedural option for parties seeking to vindicate their rights. 
Through its demeaning characterization of class arbitration as less 
efficient and unmanageable, the Court further solidified its view 
that class arbitration is incompatible with the goals of the FAA. In 
doing so, it unnecessarily expanded on the FAA’s preemptive 
powers, holding that the FAA preempted the state contract rule of 
contra proferentem. The Court’s view, however, has little basis in 
law or logic when one considers the potential benefits class pro-
ceedings offer and the potential for class arbitration to be just as 
efficient as individual arbitration, if not more in some circumstanc-
es. 
As a result of this decision, countless employees and consum-
ers subject to mandatory arbitration clauses will find themselves 
unable to seek relief through class arbitration proceedings, even if 
they are not subject to an explicit class action waiver. With the use 
of mandatory arbitration on the rise,265 more and more employees 
and consumers may potentially be unable to hold employers and 
businesses accountable for their wrongdoings. Therefore, immedi-
ate congressional action is necessary to address this judicial hostili-
ty towards class arbitration. 
 
reinforcing the FAA’s original purpose to enforce voluntary arbitration agree-
ments, within the bounds of state and federal law, is warranted.”). 
 263 See Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1732–42 (discussing 
three procedural approaches used for class arbitrations absent uniform rules). 
 264 See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019). 
 265 See supra note 15. 
